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THE EAST TIMOR SITUATION - REPORT ON TALKS WITH TIMORESE REFUGEES IN PORTUGAL

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(1) Introduction

My visit to Portugal, which took place between 5 and 23 January, was made at the initiative of non-government agencies, among them Australian Catholic Relief and Community Aid Abroad, who provided funds to meet the cost of my return fare to Lisbon. The sponsoring organizations asked me to obtain information on the plight of the Timorese refugee community in Portugal, and, if possible, some information about the humanitarian situation in East Timor itself. My own special interest was to obtain a clearer picture of what transpired in East Timor after the Indonesian invasion of Dili on 7 December 1975. The fact that nearly all of the refugees are supporters of UDT, and include some of that Party's leaders, seemed to present an opportunity to construct a more balanced account of the events leading to the civil war which began in August 1975, of what happened in Indonesian Timor when the UDT remnants withdrew there in late September 1975, and of how and when the Indonesian military intervention began.

There are about 1,500 Timorese refugees in Portugal, nearly all of whom were repatriated in several contingents between July and October of last year. The assembly point for the refugees was Atambua in Indonesian Timor where most of them had been concentrated in camps since September 1975. However, a small number of these refugees had managed last year to get to Atambua from various parts of East Timor, some of them just before the time of their repatriation. Thus a small number of Timorese in Portugal - perhaps no more than 25 - spent several months under Indonesian occupation. A few of them had initially worked for the Indonesians, or in the administration set up by them. One, for example, had been a district officer at Balibo for more than 6 months. Another had worked as a driver for

a senior Indonesian military officer. A third had worked as a police officer in the Maliana area. Among the Timorese community in Portugal there are also a number of former UDT leaders, including João Carascalao, who led the abortive coup against Fretilin in August 1975, and Paulo Pires who was one of the Timorese sent to Europe to explain "integration" in November and December 1975.

Most of the Timorese refugees in Portugal, especially those in the Estadio Nacional, near Lisbon, are living in depressing conditions. They are crowded into simple huts and tents, although the pre-fabricated dwellings now being constructed should improve their housing conditions. In view of the presence in Portugal of some 500,000 refugees from other former Portuguese colonies, and of the depressed state of the economy in a country, which is experiencing about 20% unemployment and an inflation rate of 26%, the future holds little hope for the small Timorese community, whose members are seriously disadvantaged in the competition for jobs. Refugees from Angola and Mozambique are generally better qualified. About 95% of the Timorese wish to come to Australia where more than a third of them are said to have relatives, most of whom came to Australia as refugees from Timor in August 1975. Apart from the family reunion aspect, the main reasons they gave for wanting to come to Australia were: better prospects for employment and resettlement; their desire to live in a climate more akin to that of Timor; and a general wish to live not very far from Timor, with a view to re-establishing contact with friends and relatives when access to the territory is eventually permitted by Indonesia. In Portugal, as in Australia, the Timorese community is inconspicuous and law-abiding. The High Commissioner for Refugees, Lieutenant-Colonel Ribeiro, told me that unlike the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique the Timorese never complain and seldom pressed for any improvements to their living conditions, which are probably the worst being experienced by refugees in that country.

The refugees, with a few of whom I was already acquainted, responded quite spontaneously to questions about conditions in East Timor and about their own experiences. Although they were not opposed to their experiences being made public, they were nevertheless concerned at possible reprisals in East Timor and asked that their names be withheld from publication. This I agreed to do, but most gave me to understand that they would be prepared to talk to any Australian officials, or members of an inquiry, who might wish to pursue further the matters we discussed, provided their names were protected. I made it clear to those with whom I spoke that I had gone to Portugal privately and did not represent the Australian Government. I also sought to make it clear to those who gave information that I was not searching for evidence to build up a case against Indonesia. I repeatedly told the Timorese that Australia enjoyed good relations with Indonesia and that, although many of us were disturbed at what had happened in East Timor, we were equally concerned that Indonesian actions should not be misrepresented. In the case of those Timorese who produced information of a sensational or sensitive kind, I repeatedly asked that they should not exaggerate their accounts, reminding them that the prospect of their being permitted to go to Australia would not be enhanced in any way by the information they gave me. A Timorese priest, Father Francisco Fernandes, accompanied me on most of my visits to the refugee communities. I noted that he, too, repeatedly urged the Timorese not to exaggerate their accounts.

During my stay in Portugal I visited camps containing about 900 Timorese, and talked to perhaps 200 of them. In only selected instances, however, did I record detailed notes of interviews. These concerned specific events of apparent significance. Although the fate of the Australian journalists was frequently raised, I should like to stress that I did not set out to investigate this matter in Portugal. But as information about this incident was volunteered I took note of it. It should be borne in mind that, with the limited time and means at my disposal, I was hardly in a position to take precise evidence and, although I believe my notes to be

generally accurate, further and more detailed questioning of the refugees would seem to be justified.

Refugee Accounts of the Situation in Timor

All accounts of the Indonesian military action against East Timor, and conditions under Indonesian occupation until as late as September 1976, portrayed a grim picture of the situation in the territory. Even in Indonesian Timor, according to the UDT refugees, apart from a few UDT leaders who were trusted by the Indonesians, the Timorese virtually became prisoners in refugee camps set up by the Indonesians, as soon as they crossed into Indonesian Timor. There were many accounts of how UDT supporters were not only disarmed but stripped of any personal items of value within 48 hours of the signing of the petition in September 1975. A priest, Father Fernandes, who was the Timorese delegate on a refugee committee set up by Indonesians, told me that the refugees were forced to carry out hard labour and were given very little food, usually only 100 grams of rice a day. He alleged that none of the aid which was reported to have been directed through the Indonesian Red Cross ever reached the refugees. On one occasion he saw tents near the airfield and some supplies of powdered milk in Atambua Hospital, but the hospital facilities were not available to the refugees. On the other hand, according to this priest, the actual refugee population in Indonesian Timor never exceeded 20,000. He said that he had actually witnessed the Indonesians deliberately doubling the figures.

Conditions in the refugee camp were described as grim. There were few medical facilities and the refugees were usually asked to pay for such services as injections from the meagre funds still available to them. Between September 1975 and June 1976 there were many deaths as a result of the treatment they received. The Catholic Bishop of Atambua and some of the Indonesian Timorese sympathised with the plight of the refugees but only the military had effective authority.

In Atambua the refugees were frequently humiliated. They were forced to stand to attention when they spoke to Indonesian soldiers and were sometimes ordered to bow and to address them as "bapak". The refugee camps were under armed guard and the Timorese were not allowed to move freely. The detention of the refugees continued long after conditions in Dili and several other towns in East Timor were said to be secure. For some time the refugees had pleaded to be allowed to leave Timor and go to Portugal, but they claimed that if it had not been for the intervention of the commission led by General Morais-e-Silva and the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta (which, as the representative of Portugal, took a consular interest in the plight of the Timorese at Atambua), they would not have been allowed to leave Timor. The Timorese leaders showed me a long list of names - possibly more than 5,000 - of Timorese who had asked to go to Portugal. However, only those who happened to be at Atambua between June and October 1976 had apparently been permitted to leave the country. In the event, this included a small number of Timorese and Chinese who managed to get from Dili to the Atambua concentration area.

I was particularly interested to talk to those Timorese who had spent some time in East Timor after the Indonesian invasion. There are probably about 25 Timorese of this category among the refugees and I talked at some length to more than half of them. Because of the importance of what they had to say, I sought to ensure that their accounts were as accurate as possible. In each case I urged them not to exaggerate or distort their accounts. Without exception, however, they related stories of excesses by Indonesian troops as the latter entered towns and villages. A number of these accounts were from people who claimed to have witnessed the incidents. Others that I took note of were from sources that seemed reliable - e.g. priests who had not been involved in the politics of East Timor, and who had not initially been strongly opposed to "integration". According to informants, many of the Indonesian troops killed indiscriminately from the beginning of their attack on Dili. However a priest and

a Timorese who worked for some 10 months as driver and interpreter for a senior Indonesian officer, both said that the killing in the mountain areas was far more extensive than it was in Dili. In the mountain areas, they claimed, whole villages were wiped out as Indonesian troops advanced into the interior. I was given an account of how Indonesians shot an entire family simply because they heard that the family had given a chicken to Fretilin soldiers; of families being shot when Indonesians discovered a Fretilin flag in their house. According to a priest the entire Chinese population of Maubara and Liquica was shot by the Indonesian troops when they entered these villages. A Timorese who said he had accompanied the Indonesians said that when the Indonesian troops captured Remexio and Aileu, all the Timorese in the village, except children under the age of three were shot, because "they were infected with the seeds of Fretilin". A priest also told me that the Indonesians shot more than 150 men in the town of Suai (on the south coast) because they tried to prevent the Indonesian troops from interfering with their women folk.

There were few first hand accounts of the situation outside the Balibo/Maliana and Dili areas. One of these was from a Timorese who said that he was in Baucau when the Indonesians attacked that town on 10 December 1975. He said there were few casualties at first, but that later, the troops shot many Chinese. There was, however, according to this informant a great deal of looting and raping of girls in Baucau. I was also told that fighting in the Baucau/Los Palos/Viqueque area had last year been very intense, because of effective operations by Fretilin.

A Timorese, who said that he had worked as a driver for Indonesian troops, gave an account of an incident at Lamaknan (Lakmaras), a location in Indonesian Timor near the border. This informant said that in June last year he had driven troops to this area where Fretilin troops were active.

The Indonesians set fire to the dwellings of East Timorese refugees who were camped there. When the refugees protested the Indonesians turned their guns on them. According to this informant, who said he was a witness to this episode, the troops shot, he thought, 2,000 of the Timorese, some on their knees, others with their hands raised. The victims, he said, included women and children.

A number of refugees gave accounts of events in Dili at the time of the Indonesian invasion and in the aftermath. Several of the refugees who included both Chinese and Timorese, had been in Dili at the time of the invasion, and a few had been there as recently as September/October last year. One of the priests had spent two weeks in Dili in April, while at least two of the refugees had been among those who were taken to Dili to participate in the "act of free choice".

A number of Timorese gave their accounts of how Indonesian troops behaved at the time of the invasion. According to several accounts, on 6 December, the eve of the invasion, there was a general feeling that an Indonesian attack was imminent. Fretilin forces withdrew behind Taibesse, towards the mountains. Many people confined themselves to their houses, but quite a few moved into the church of St. Antonio which is near the lighthouse on the esplanade facing Dili harbour. The latter was therefore well placed to observe the Indonesian landing. According to the refugees account, warships shelled Dili before dawn and some aircraft straffed the town but little damage was sustained. Four persons, including two Timorese and two Chinese, gave accounts of indiscriminate killing by Indonesian troops. Two of those who had sought refuge in the Church told me that the Indonesian paratroops began shooting down people in the streets as soon as they landed, which was shortly after dawn. One said that several paratroopers drowned because they landed in the bay instead of on land. One refugee, who was in the Church gave the following account.

At 7.00 a.m. she said she saw Indonesian paratroops shoot a woman in the parish garage adjacent to the Church, and three others in front of the Church, although they had their hands raised. She gave the names of two of these people. The Indonesian troops then ordered all people near the Church to go inside. At 9.00 o'clock on the following morning, however, she and others were ordered by Indonesian soldiers to go to the wharf where some 27 women captives, some Chinese and some Timorese, were being held. She said some of the women had children and all of them were crying. The Indonesians, she said, tore the crying children from their mothers and passed them back to the crowd. The women were then shot one by one, with the onlookers being ordered by the Indonesians to count.

At 2.00 p.m. 59 men, both Chinese and Timorese, were brought onto the wharf. One was her brother-in-law, , whose widow, my informant told me, is in Australia with her two children. These men were shot one by one, again with the crowd, which she believed amounted to some 500, being ordered to count. The victims were ordered to stand on the edge of the pier facing the sea, so that when they were shot their bodies fell into the water. Indonesian soldiers stood by and fired at the bodies in the water in the event that there was any further sign of life. Many of the men, and the women who had been executed earlier, had pleaded with the Indonesians, some of them on their knees, but none of the group was spared. Another informant told me that the next day the bodies were washed up on the beach opposite the Bishop's house and Timorese were subsequently ordered to remove them. These informants said that they had heard that further executions had been carried out on the wharf.

Other persons who claimed to have first hand knowledge of similar indiscriminate killings included a Chinese who said he saw Indonesians shoot a group of Chinese leaders in the street near the Mimosa Hotel, and the driver of a Red Cross jeep which was clearly marked. Another gave an account of the shooting of 30 persons outside the former military police headquarters on the day after the invasion. There were several accounts of the killing of many Chinese men who were separated from their families and then shot. One of these was said to have taken

place in the shop Toko Lay. My informant said that the Indonesians had become enraged at the sight of an Australian flag protruding from the third floor of this building. They went up and shot all of the Chinese men in the apartment which housed 20 refugees. On the day after the attack, there were dead bodies everywhere in the streets of Dili, including many women and some children. At least two of the refugees in Portugal said they were among those ordered by Indonesian troops to help remove the bodies.

According to one informant many Timorese were shot in the Taibesse area when the Indonesians shot the entire families of houses which displayed Fretilin flags. Others said that near the Airport the Indonesians had killed many people by simply throwing hand-grenades into houses. A priest mentioned a figure of 60 persons who died this way.

According to a priest it was the Chinese who suffered during the first days after the invasion. On the first day alone, he said that he had been told that as many as 500 Chinese had been killed by Indonesian troops. In addition to the wharf area and military police headquarters, groups of people were deliberately shot, according to informants, at Villaverde, near Sang Tai Hoo, Santa Cruz, near the shop of Lay Ju Man, near the former Australian Consulate, (where some nurses were reported to have been shot), outside the house of João de Martires, a former Director of Customs, at Military Police Headquarters and near the former International Red Cross Headquarters.

The refugees all claimed that Indonesian soldiers looted extensively from the first days of the invasion. Shortly after the landing at Dili, according to several informants, most of the towns people were ordered by the soldiers to go to a location near the airport. When they returned their houses had been thoroughly ransacked, and in some cases they were completely empty. Cars, radios, items

of furniture, cutlery, even windows were taken to ships in the harbour and later away from Timor. Most of the cars left in Dili were taken on board ships by Indonesian soldiers. Most of the tractors in the Dili area, according to informants, were taken away. According to priests, most Churches and the Seminary were also looted, and their books burnt.

According to the refugees some killing continued in the Dili area until the end of February. However, the place of execution was said to have been moved from the wharf to Tasitalo, a location near the airport. According to one informant, as recently as 17 August last year a number of people were killed for refusing to participate in an Indonesian Independence Day demonstration. An informant said she knew at least three of the victims: they included a Chinese named Colina Lay, whom she knew well. According to an account between March and April 1976, a number of Indonesians, in particular several officers, attempted to improve relations with the local population, but, according to this informant, their efforts were always thwarted by the continuing looting and raping by Indonesian soldiers. I was told that it was common for Indonesian soldiers to round up young girls in trucks and rape them. It was also alleged that a special intelligence unit operating on the top floor of the Tropical Hotel regularly resorted to torture to obtain information about Fretilin. The officer in charge of this "interrogation unit" was Major Yusman, who worked to the Senior Intelligence Officer in East Timor, Colonel Sinaga, a man who is reportedly disliked and feared. One woman informant said she knew two women who had been tortured in an effort to obtain information about Fretilin. She said Elda Soldanha and Maria Pereira were stripped naked, and their breasts were burnt with cigarettes. She said that electrical instruments were also used on their bodies.

I was told that after April Dili was relatively secure, although sometimes shots could be heard at night. A priest said that when he travelled from Dili to Dare (the location of the Seminary which is about 5 kilometres from the town) in April 1976 his jeep was accompanied by three armoured vehicles and a truckload of soldiers. They were fired on during their journey and the Indonesian soldiers insisted that they would need to return before nightfall. Although Dili was relatively calm after April, refugees spoke of a growing food shortage. A woman who left Dili in September, said that relations between the Indonesians and the Chinese and Timorese community in Dili continued to be very bad, right up until the time of her departure. She said that little food was available to the people in Dili and virtually nothing was made available to the people outside the city. She said that it was possible to obtain a ration of three small condensed milk cans of rice each week but that no meat could be obtained by the ordinary people. She said that dog meat was being eaten when it could be procured. The Timorese could buy no clothing. Several of the shops had reopened under the management of Indonesians or Arabs (a small Moslem community near Dili which supported Apodeti) but the ordinary people had no money to purchase the goods offered by these shops.

The refugees all said that most Indonesians maintained an attitude of arrogant hostility to the local population. The Timorese were usually forced to stand to attention when talking to ordinary Indonesian soldiers. A refusal to do so could lead to a beating. When houses were exhausted of loot the Indonesian soldiers turned to the graves of Europeans and the more wealthy Timorese. I was informed by a priest that the Indonesians dug up the grave of Father Martins in Maliana (I spent a night in his Mission some 12 years ago) and removed his gold tooth. The graves of chiefs were also exhumed by soldiers in search of loot (Timorese chiefs are usually buried with some of their jewels).

The refugees said that the senior Indonesian officer in Dili was Brigadier General Dading, who was described as "Panglima" or Commander of the Military Forces in East Timor. However the overall Commander was Major General Moerdani, whom, a UDT leader told me, usually lived at Kupang. Other senior officers in Dili were Colonel Sinaga and Major Anton Papilaya, who was a senior intelligence officer. General Dading lived in a house in the Farol area, which was formerly used by the Mayor. All the houses in the Farol area, which had previously been occupied by officials, were said to be occupied by troops. On the occasions when U.N. or foreign delegations visited Dili, the troops were sent out of Dili or dressed in civilian clothes. Both the Military Commander and the Provincial Government of Araujo had their offices in the Administrative Palace. The Timorese provisional officials, however, had little power, for Timor was dominated by the military at every level of administration.

Several refugees told me that the Indonesians had established a war cemetary in a square opposite the wharf. A priest said that there were more than 600 graves in the cemetary, but that there were other cemetaries at Maliana, Ainaro, Baucau and Batugade. In Maliana he saw the grave of a Brigadier-General. A Timorese who had worked as an interpreter for a senior Indonesian military officer said that in Dili there were almost 1000 Indonesian graves and that one of the dead was a Lieutenant Colonel. According to these accounts, more than 3000, perhaps more than 5000 Indonesian soldiers have died in the fighting in East Timor. I was told that Fretilin resistance (and many former UDT and even Apodeti members were said to have joined Fretilin after the invasion) was so effective that Indonesian control did not extend more than a few miles beyond the main towns. The extensive and indiscriminate killing had alienated the population, giving Fretilin wide popular support.

I asked the leaders of the refugee community whether it was conceivable that 100,000 people have been killed in East Timor. All said that this figure was credible, because of the widespread killing in the mountains, and because of the extensive bombing (I was told that in recent months napalm was used). Many people had left the main towns and villages and were now in the mountains, in areas more or less under Fretilin control. The Timorese who has worked for a senior army officer said that there were, in September, about 30,000 Indonesian soldiers in East Timor. The latest information related to the situation in Timor in November. A Chinese, who had left Dili at that time (he went to Portugal via Jakarta) said that with the coming of the wet season the security situation had deteriorated. Food in Dili was very scarce because supplies could not be obtained from the producing areas.

Information Concerning Australian Journalists Killed or Missing in East Timor

A number of Timorese offered information about the Balibo incident and the fate of Roger East. They included UDT leaders and Timorese who claimed that they had been in Balibo on the day of the attack, during which the five Australian journalists were killed, that is, on Thursday 16 October, 1975. Others had spent some time there after the incident and offered second-hand information about how the journalists were killed. I should emphasise again that it was not my intention to undertake an independent enquiry into the death of the journalists, but, as I was in Timor at the time of the Balibo incident and knew something of the background to it, it seemed appropriate that I should collect this information.

A former UDT leader said that the attack on Balibo and Maliana on 16 October 1975 was the first major Indonesian military intervention in Timor, although earlier, on 6 October, they had attacked Batugade and forced Fretilin troops to retire to Balibo. He said that the attack on Balibo and

Maliana was entirely an Indonesian operation under the command of Colonel Dading (later promoted Brigadier-General). The attack on Balibo itself was under the command of a Major Leo or Leos. A few Timorese - between 50 and 100 - went along with the Indonesians, but their role was confined to bearers and guides. These were led by Tomas Goncalves, who for several months previously had been an Apodeti leader in Indonesian Timor. This informant said that he himself did not go to Balibo at that time, but that according to information he received from those of his men who went with the Indonesians, the account given by Martins was generally accurate. He said that at least two of the journalists were deliberately shot by Indonesian troops. He also said that the Indonesians had propped two of the bodies behind a machine-gun and had photographed it, with the aim of using the photograph as evidence that the journalists had been fighting on the side of Fretilin. He said that although he was not a witness to this he had subsequently seen the photograph; he had been told later that Bakin (the Indonesian intelligence coordinating body) had decided against making use of it. This informant and two other refugees (including a priest) separately told me that João Tavares, a former UDT leader who threw in his lot with the Indonesians and is now Bupati of Maliana) was in Balibo at about the time the journalists were killed and took a watch from one of the dead journalists and a camera from another body. A Timorese, who had been a policeman at Balibo until some time last year said that he was in the village some time after the killing. He said he saw the bodies of persons he believed to be the journalists in the house of Lay Fah Nhang. Afterwards the bodies were carried to another house and burnt. He also said that his brother-in-law had gone into Balibo with the Indonesians and saw one journalist killed by an Indonesian soldier whose first name he thought was Gabriel. His brother-in-law had said that two of the journalists were killed inside the house and others outside.

A Timorese who said he had served as district officer in Balibo until September 1976 offered some information about the killing of the journalists. He said that although he was not there at the time of the attack on Balibo it was common knowledge that the journalists were killed in the house of Lay Fah Nhang. The former district officer said he was at Balibo when some Australian diplomats visited the town to investigate the killing of the journalists. He said that Indonesians ordered the Timorese away from the centre of the village. Indonesian troops were dressed in civilian clothes, according to this account, and it was they who met the Australian diplomats. The district officer said that he himself was instructed by the Indonesians not to approach or speak to the Australians. The only Timorese to talk to the Australians, he said, was João Tavares, now bupati of the Maliana district. He said that the diplomats were taken not to the house where the journalists were killed but to another house, the house of Lay Cam Nhang. The district officer also mentioned that João Tavares had at the time of the incident taken some items, including a watch and a camera from the bodies of the journalists.

Another Timorese informed me that his brother had accompanied the Indonesians during their attack on Balibo. He said that his brother had told him that he had seen one journalist on the ground outside the house and two others with their hands raised. According to this Timorese his brother told him that he saw these two journalists shot by RPKAD troops. A further account came from a Timorese who said his brother went into Balibo at the time of the Indonesian attack on the morning of 16 October. He entered the village shortly after the troops had moved in. The brother said that he entered the house of Lay Fat (also Lay Fah Nhang) and saw several bodies on the floor. One Australian, however, was not dead. Blood was coming from a wound on his head but he was sitting down and speaking into a taperecorder or radio.

While he was in the room an Indonesian soldier shot the wounded Australian.

I was told by yet another Timorese that two of the bodies were photographed near a machine gun before they were taken away and burned.

A further scrap of information came from the brother of a UDT leader who said that he went to Balibo with Tomas Goncalves and saw the bodies of the journalists, which, by that time, were in front of the house of Lay Fah Nhang. He said he was not allowed to approach the bodies.

There was only one reference to Roger East who is believed to have been in Dili on 7 December 1975. A Timorese leader told me that although he had no first hand information about what had happened to East, he had seen his passport, together with some sheets of paper with notes about a paratroop landing, on the desk of an official of the provincial government of East Timor. My informant said that the official told him that Indonesian troops had shot East and some Timorese in an apartment in Dili between the Sporting Club and the BNU (The Overseas National Bank) on 7 or 8 December 1975.

Conclusion

An analysis of the information I collected from the Timorese refugees in Portugal adds considerable substance to the sketchy reports, which have been received in Australia during the past twelve months from Indonesian, Timorese-Chinese and Fretilin sources, that the Indonesian military seizure of East Timor has been a bloody operation, in which atrocities of a disturbing nature, have been committed against the civilian population. Indeed, these accounts of Indonesia's behaviour in East Timor, suggest that the plight of these people might well constitute, relatively speaking, the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time. Reports that one sixth of the population may have been killed are impossible to assess, let alone authenticate, but the

fact that such reports persist serves to highlight the magnitude of the tragedy of Timor.

The refugee accounts of what happened at Balibo suggest that at least some of the journalists may have been killed deliberately by Indonesian soldiers. These accounts, though by no means conclusive, are on the whole consistent and they seem to open up new avenues of inquiry. The refugees' accounts seem conclusive in one respect: it is surely inconceivable that the attack on Balibo was other than an Indonesian military operation, in which Timorese participation was small and of the non-combatant kind. That the responsibility for the consequencies of this operation rests with the Indonesian military command in Timor would thus seem beyond doubt.

This report is by no means an exhaustive study of the information available from among the Timorese refugee community in Portugal. Factors of time and distance prevented me from meeting many Timorese who may be able to contribute to our knowledge of important aspects of this tragic situation. Indeed, in the interests of accuracy, I have omitted from this report a number of the accounts I collected during my visit to Portugal. Names have also usually been omitted, but these can be produced on request provided conditions of confidentiality are established.